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NORTH DAKcTA LAW REVIEW
During his 1968 trial, a psychiatrist testified that the defendant had
the XYY chromosomal make-up, "which means that every cell in
his body and the brain is abnormal."'" Hannell was acquitted by
the jury on the ground that he was insane when he committed the
murder.
5 4
The XYY syndrome was also raised as a defense in a French
court during the 1968 murder trial of Daniel Hugon, 5 who was al-
leged to have killed a prostitute in a Paris hotel. The defense intro-
duced scientific evidence of a link between the XYY 'syndrome and
the accused's criminal behavior. Although the court found Hugon
legally sane, it considered the XYY abnormality as a mitigating
factor in sentencing.
56
The decision by the New York court in Yukl not to allow evi-
dence of Yukl's XYY syndrome as part of the defense of insanity
in his murder trial is perhaps questionable. New York follows the
ALI rule 57 as to the defense of insanity, and it could have been
left to the jury to decide whether the XYY abnormality caused a
substantial impairment of Yukl's capacity to conform his conduct
to the requirements of the law. The limited case law in ALl juris-
dictions and elsewhere on the XYY syndrome indicated that the syn-
drome might validly be considered in cases involving a defense of
insanity. 5' Although more research is probably necessary to clearly
establish the genetic imbalance theory of crime causation, 59 Yukl
perhaps should have been allowed to bring in experts in the fields
of psychiatry and genetics to attempt to establish the link between
his genetic structure and a substantial impairment in his mental ca-
pacity.
TOM ALJETS
PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS-INFANTS-PHYSICIAN'S LIABILITY FOR
NONCOMPLIANCE WITH CHILD ABUSE REPORTING STATUTE
Plaintiff, an 11-month-,old child, was taken by her mother to de-
fendant hospital for treatment and diagnosis of a fracture in her
53. Id.
54. It is Impossible to know what signifance the jury attached to the XYY condition,
since other evidence was introduced to show insanity in more conventional psychiatric
terms. Id. at 97, col. 2.
55. N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1968, at 5, col. 4 (city ed.). A chromosome analysis made
after an attempted suicide by -ugon revealed that he had the XYY genetic abnormality.
56. Id.
57. See Note 47, supra.
58. See Notes 42-48, supra, and text accompanying.
59. See Note 2, supro.
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right leg.1 The child also had other injuries.2 The mother gave no
explanation as to the cause of the injuries and defendant physi-
cian apparently sought none. The child was treated and sent home
with her mother. Several months later, plaintiff was again brought
to the hospital with very severe injuries that were obviously not the
result of an accident.3 Plaintiff was taken from her mother's cus-
tody and a guardian ad litem was appointed. The guardian brought
a common law malpractice action against defendants physician and
hospital, alleging that they were negligent in failing to detect the
"battered child syndrome ' 4 and in failing to report the case to the
proper authorities when the child was first brought to them. It was
further alleged that as a proximate result of the defendants' negli-
gence, the child was released to her parents5 and suffered further
injury.8 Plaintiff also sought damages under the California Child
Abuse Reporting Law.7 At trial, the court sustained defendants' de-
murrer to the complaint and plaintiff appealed. The appellate court, s
in reversing, held that no recovery could be had under common law
malpractice principles, but that liability could be found under the
California Child Abuse Reporting Law.9 Landeros v. Flood, 50 Cal.
App. 3d 115, 123 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1975).
1. Plaintiff had a communited spiral fracture of the tibia and fibula of her right leg.
The fracture appeared to have been caused by a twisting force. Landeros v. Flood, 50
Cal. App. 3d 115, - , 132 Cal. Rptr. 713, 717 (1975).
2. In addition to the leg fracture, plaintiff had bruises on other parts of her body and
had a lineal skull fracture which was in the process of healing. Id. at - , 123 Cal.
Rptr. at 717.
8. Plaintiff's amended complaint stated that:
[On] or about July 1, 1971, plaintiff sustained and suffered from great trau-
matic blows to her right eye and back, puncture wounds over her left lower
leg and across her back, severe bites on her face, and second' and third degree
burns to plaintiff's left hand.
Id. at -, n.4, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 719, n.4.
4. See note 10 infra.
5. The child's mother was living with her common law husband at the time. It was not
stated in the record whether he was the child's natural father. Landeros v. Flood, 50
Cal. App. 3d 115, --, 123 Cal. Rptr. 713, 717, n.2.
6. See note 3 supra.
7. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11161.5 (West Supp. 1976) provides in part:
(a) In any case In which a minor is brought to a physician and surgeon,
dentist, resident, intern, podiatrist, chiropractor, or religious practitioner
for diagnosis, examination or treatment . . .and it appears to the physician
and surgeon . . . from observation of the minor that the minor has physical
injury or injuries which appear to have been inflicted upon him by other
than accidental means by any person. . . . he shall report such fact by tele-
phone and in writing, within 36 hours, to both the local police authority
having jurisdiction and to the juvenile probation department....
CAL. PENAL CODE § 11162 (West 1970) sets forth the penalty for failing to, comply
with section 11161.5: imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or a fine not
exceeding $500.00 or both.
8. The California Court of Appeals for the First District, Division 2.
9. Plaintiff actually alleged four causes of action. The first involved common law mal-
practice for failing to diagnose the battered child syndrome and report it to the authori-
ties. See note 10 infra. The second cause of action was under CAL. PENAL CODE § 11161.5
(West Supp. 1976). See note 7 supra. The third cause of action was under CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 11160 and 11161 (West 1970), which require hospitals and other health Institu-
tions to report suspected cases of child abuse. The court in Landeros v. Flood, 50 Cal.
App. 3d 115, 123 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1975), dismissed the third cause of action, holding that
since section 11161.5 was enacted after sections 11160 and 11161, and dealt primarily
with the same subject matter, section 11161.5 superseded the earlier statutes. The fourth
cause of action was for punitive damages, and was dropped on appeal.
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Child Abuse Reporting Laws are of recent development. The
first ones were enacted in the early 1960's as a result of increased
publicity of the child abuse problem and the medical recognition
of the battered child syndrome.'0 By the mid-1960's, almost every
state had a reporting statute."'
The greatest problem in controlling child abuse has been de-
tection.1 2 The layman does not often report suspected cases of child
abuse to the proper authorities for fear of civil liability in the form
of a lawsuit for defamation or for invasion of privacy." There is a
prevalent attitude among most people that what others do with their
own children is their own business and interference in other's domestic
affairs is officious intermeddling. 14  Also involved is the apparent
10. See Kempe, Silverman, Steele, Droegermnueller and Silver, The Battered Child Syn-
drome, 181 J.A.M.A. 17 (1962). This is the leading article on the subject of child mistreat-
ment. In It, the battered child syndrome is defined as a clinical.condition in young chil-
dren who have received serious physical abuse, generally from parents. The syndrome
should be considered in the case of any child exhibiting evidence of possible trauma or
neglect, or where there Is a marked discrepancy between clinical findings and historical
data of the child's injury as supplied by the parents. Id. at -.
The battered child syndrome has become a legally accepted medical diagnosis In
several jurisdictions, and expert testimony concerning it has been allowed in criminal
cases dealing with child abuse. See, e.g., State v. Best, - S.D.- , 232 N.11V.2d 447, 458
(1975); People v. Jackson, 18 Cal. App. 3d 504, 95 Cal. Rptr. 9-19 (1917); State v. Loss,
295 Minn. 558,, 204 N.W.2d 404, 409 (1973).
11. Paulsen, The Legal Fram)iework for Child Protection, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 679, 711
(1966). By 1966, only the District of Columbia, Hawaii and Mississippi did not have re-
porting statutes. Hawaii enacted one in 1967 and the District of Columbia followed in
1970. Mississippi has not yet enacted a reporting statute.
The child abuse reporting statutes now in effect are: ALA. CODE tit. 27, §§ 21-25
(Cum. Supp. 1973); ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.17.010-47.17.070 (1975); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-842.01 (Supp. 1973); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-807-42-818 (Cum. Supp. 1975); CAL.
PENAL, CODE § 11161.5 (West Supp. 1976) ; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-10-101-19-10-108
(1973) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a (Supp. 1976) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 901-908
(1974); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 2-161-2-166 (1973) FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 827.07, 827.041
(Supp. 1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-111 (Supp. 1975); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 350-1-350-5
(1968); IDAHO CODE § 16-1641 (Cum. Supp. 1975); TLL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, §§ 2041-2045
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975); IND. ANN. STAT. §3 12-3-4.1-1-12-3-4.1-6 (Burns 1973); IOWA
CODE ANN. §§ 235A.1-235A.11 (Cum. Supp. 1976); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-716-38-724
(Cum. Supp. 1975) ; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.335 (Baldwin 1969) : LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:403 (West Supp. 1975); ME. REV. STAT. AN,. tit. 22, §§ 3851-3860 (Supp. 1975);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A (Cum. Supp. 1975); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, §
51A (Supp. 1975) ; MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 722-571-722.574 (1968) ; M NN. STAT. ANN.
§ 626.556 (Supp. 1976); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.115 (Vernon Supp. 1976); MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. §§ 10-1304-10-1308 (Cum. Supp. 1975); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-1501-28-1508
(Cur. Supp. 1974); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 200.501-200.508 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 169:37-169:45 (Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. §3 9:6-8.8-9:6-8.20 (Supp. 1975) : N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 13-14-14.1-13-14-14.2 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW §§ 411-428
(Mclinney Supp. 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-118 (Supp. 1975); N.D. CENT. CODE §§
50-25.1-50-25.1-14 (Supp. 1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (Supp. (1975); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 845-849 (Supp. 1975) ; OAR. REV. STAT. § 418.750 (1974) ; PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 11. §§ 2101-2110 (Supp. 1975); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 40-11-1-40-11-10 (Supp.
1975) ; S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-310.1-20-310.5 (1962) ; S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 26-10-10
(Supp. 1975); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 37-1201-37-1212 (Cum. Supp. 1975); TEX. PAM. CODE
ANN. §§ 34.01-34.08 (Cum. Supp. 1975); UTA14 CODE ANN. §§ 55-16-1-55-16-7 (Supp.
1975) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 1351-1355 (Cum. Supp. 1975) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.3
(Cum. Supp. 1975); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.44.010-26.44.080 (Supp. 1974); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 49-6A-2 (1976) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.981 (Cur. Supp. 1975) ; WYo. STAT.
ANN. §§ 14-28.8-14-28.13 (Cum, Supp. 1975).
12. McCoid, The Battered Child and Other Assaults Upon the Family, 50 MINN. L. REV.
1, 86 (1965).
13. Id.
14. Paulsen, The Legal Framework for Child Protection, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 679, 710
(1966).
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belief among many people that their friends and neighbors, obviously
good people, could not be child abusers. 15 Because of these beliefs
and attitudes, cases of child abuse simply have not been reported to
the authorities.
Perhaps more than anyone else, physicians are in a position to
see and to recognize cases of child abuse. 16 But before the enactment
of reporting statutes, physicians rarely reported suspected and
even known cases of child abuse."7 There were two principal rea-
sons for this: first, physicians were afraid of civil liability in the
form of a lawsuit for defamation or invasion of privacy,18 and;
second, the confidentiality of the physician-patient relationship pre-
vented many doctors from reporting.'9
Since physicians would logically come into contact with cases of
child abuse more often than others, 20 and because it is generally
felt by legislatures that physicians possess the skill and expertise
needed to detect battered children, 2' most reporting statutes are di-
rected principally at physicians. 2' North Dakota's first reporting
statute,'3 enacted in 1965, was representative of the early report-
ing statutes in that it singled out physicians, chiropractors, and pub-
lic health nurses, and required them to report to the proper au-
thorities whenever they had reasonable cause to believe they had
detected a case of child abuse. Many of the child abuse reporting
statutes now in effect have expanded considerably the class of peo-
ple required to report suspected cases of child abuse; most require
teachers, dentists, and others who deal regularly with children to re-
port suspected cases of child abuse.' 4 Many of the statutes' 5 have
15. Id.
16. See McCoid, note 12 supra, at 27. See also, Isaacson, Child Abuse Reporting Statutes:
The Case for Holding Physicians Civilly Liable for Failing to Report, 12 SAN DIEOo L. REV.
743, 745 (1975).
17. Kohlman, Malpractice Liability for Failing to Report Child. Abuse, 49 CAL. S.B.J.
118, 120 (1974).
18. See Paulsen, note 14 supra.
19. See Paulsen, note 14 supra.
20. See Isaacson, note 16 supra.
21. See McCoid, note 12 supra, at 28.
22. See Paulsen, note 14 supra, at 712.
23. Ch. 327, §§ 1-5 [1965] LAWS OF N.D., repealed by ch. 448, § 15 [1975] LAwS OF
N.D.
24. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.17.010-47.17.070 (1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-807-
42-818 (Cum. Supp. 1975); CAL. PENAL CODE § 11161.5 (West Supp. 1976). See also note
58 infra.
25. All the statutes have provided that there is immunity from civil liability for re-
porting suspected cases of child abuse, if that report is made in good faith. See, e.g.,
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-807-42-818 (Cum. Supp. 1975); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
19-10-101-19-10-108 (1973) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 901-908 (1974).
Statutes vary in their treatment of the physician-patient privilege. There are several
statutes which make no mention whatsoever about any privilege. See, e.g., GA. COoE ANN.
§ 74-111 (Supp. 1975); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 3851-3860 (Supp. 1975); MD. CODE
ANN. art. 27, § 35A (Cum. Supp. 1975). It anpears that only the husband-wife privilege
Is abrogated in CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a (Supp. 1976), and that the patient-
physician privilege remains intact in Connecticut. Several jurisdictions have abolished
the patient-physician privilege for the purposes of the reporting statute, but have specifi-
cally retained the attorney-client privilege. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-807-42-818
(Cum. Supp. 1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 827.07 (Supp. 1975); IDAHO CODE § 16-1641 (Cum,
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removed one or both of the two major impediments which have
kept physicians from reporting: the fear of civil liability and confi-
dential nature of the relationship between physician and patient.2 6
In 1975, North Dakota enacted an entirely new child abuse re-
porting statute. 27 The class required to report was expanded consi-
derably. Immunity from liability for reporting was retained, and was
expanded to cover anyone who reported a suspected case of child
abuse, whether required to report or not. 2  The abrogation of the
physician-patient privilege was retained for purposes of the statute. 29
The court in Landeros first dealt with the allegation of malprac-
tice based on the failure to diagnose the battered child syndrome,
and concluded that there was no breach of duty on the physician's
part in failing to diagnose such a syndrome.3 0 The court noted that
the condition denominated as the battered child syndrome is not
clearly defined and embraces a vast array of phenomena.3 1 Further-
more, although the battered child syndrome has received extensive
treatment in medical journals,'32 physicians in general practice do
not come into contact with enough cases of child abuse to become
familiar with and be able to recognize the battered child syndrome. 33
Supp. 1975). In the District of Columbia, it is to be determined by the court in each case
whether the privilege has been waived. See, D.C. CODE ANN. §. 2-161-2-166 (1973).
It appears that in most jurisdictions, the physician-patient privilege has been abro-
gated for the purposes of the child abuse reporting statute.
26. The 1965 North Dakota statute was representative, In that it provided immunity
from civil and criminal liability for anyone required to report, and abrogated the physician-
patient privilege in regard to reported cases. Ch. 327, §§ 4-5, [1965] LAWS OF N.D., re-
pealed by ch. 448, § 15 [1975] LAws OF N.D.
27. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 50-25.1-01 through 50-25.1-14 (Supp. 1975). Section 50-25.1-03
provides that:
1. Any physician, nurse, dentist, optometrist, medical examiner or coro-
ner, or any other medical or mental health professional, school teacher or
administrator, school counselor, social worker, day care center or any other
child care worker, police or law enforcement officer having knowledge of or
reasonable cause to suspect that a child coming before him in his official or
professional capacity Is abused or neglected shall report the circumstances
to the division. [The division of community services of the social service
board of North Dakota].
2. Any person having reasonable cause to suspect that a child is abused
or neglected may report such circumstances to the division.
28. N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-09 (Supp. 1975).
29. N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-10 (Supp. 1975).
30. Landeros v. Flood, 50 Cal. App. 3d 115, -, 123 Cal. Rptr. 713, 718 (1975).
31. Id. See Kempe, et.al., note 10 snpra: Silver, Dublin and Lourie, Child Abuse Syn-
drome: The "Grey Areas" in Establishing Diagvosis, 44 PEDrATRics 595 (1969).
Another factor involved is that:
[i]dentification of the abused child is tempered by awareness of the fact that
children may suffer physical mars, bruises, and scratches due neither to
parental neglect nor intent, and at any one time may coincidentally show a
variety of types of physical marks (e.g., a black eye, cut lip, bruised ear,
scratches, and diaper rash burns), even though their parents may be loving,
concerned, and reasonably careful.
The Battered Child, 8 SAN DrEGo L. REV. 364, 365, n.2 (1971).
32. E.g., Kempe, Silverman, Steele, Droegermueller and Silver, The Battered Child
Syndrome, 181 J.A.M.A. 17 (1962); Paulsen and Blake, The Abused, Battered and Mal-
treated Child: A Review, 9 TRAUMA 4:7 (1967) : Silver, Dublin and Lourie, Child Abuse
,gyndrome: The "Grey Areas" in Establishing Diagnosis, 44 PEDIATICS 595 (1969).
33. See Gwinn, Lewin and Peterson, Roentgenographic Manifestations of Unsuspected
Trauma in Infancy, 176 J.A.M.A. 926 (1961). Contact with children who are the victims
of child abuse is apparently not an everyday occurrence for the average general prac-
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In short, battered child syndrome is simply not yet a part of the
skill and learning of the everyday medical practicioner. 4 There is
thus no basis, the court noted, for imposing upon physicians a legal
duty to correctly diagnose the battered child syndrome.3 5
The court in Landeros noted that even if the battered child syn-
drome is diagnosed, there is no common law duty to report it to the
authorities. In the cases in which a physician has been held liable
for failing to report specific diseases, the duty to report was imposed
by statute2t In the absence -of a statute requiring the physician to
report, there may be a moral, but not a legal, duty to report.
3 7
Applying the principles enunciated in Landeros,5 it appears there
can be no recovery under common law malpractice for failure to re-
port cases of child abuse. If there is to be any recovery at all, it must
be under the reporting statutes.
Landeros v. Flood"' was the first case in the United States in
which recovery for injuries was sought under a child abuse reporting
statute. 40 The duty to report cases of suspected child abuse has been
established under the reporting statutes.41 Most of the statutes do
titioner, and injuries that are discovered are often attributed to accidental causes. See
note 31 sapra.
34. Landeros v. Flood, 50 Cal. App. 3d 115, -, 123 Cal. Rptr. 713, 719 (1975). See
W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 32 (4th ed. 1971). The standard' for judging the professional
conduct of physicians has been said to be that of the reasonably prudent physician in
comparable circumstances.
The law requires only that a physician or surgeon have the degree of learning
and skill possessed by practitioners of the medical profession in the same
locality and that he exercise ordinary care in applying such learning and skill
to the treatment of his patient.
Landeros v. Flood. 50 Cal. App. 3d 115, -, 123 Cal. Rptr. 713, 717-18 (1975).
35. There may be liability for failure to exercise ordinary skill and, learning in diagnosis
where the disease or injury involved is part of the general knowledge of the profession.
See, e(-., Wilson v. Corbin, 241 Iowa 593, 41 N.W.2d 702 (1950) ; Mangiameli v. Ariano,
126 Neb. 629, 253 N.W. 871 (1914); Johnson v. Borland, 317 Mich. 225, 26 N.W.2d 755
(1947). The failure to diagnose the battered child syndrome, however, will not render a
physician liable, since the syndrome is not yet part of the general knowledge of the medi-
cal profession.
36. There are at least three cases in which a duty on the part of a physician to. re-
port diseases was found: Dietsch v. Mayherry, 70 Ohio App. 527, 47 N.E.2d 404 (1942);
Medlin v. Bloom, 230 Mass. 201, 119 N.E. 773 (1918) ; and Jones v. Stanko, 118 Ohio St.
147, 160 N.E. 456 (1928). In all three of these cases, the duty to report was imposed by
statute. All three involved easily recognized contagious diseases (black smallpox in Jones
and inflammation of the eyes in Medlin and Dietsch), and were not concerned with any-
thing as vague as the battered child syndrome. Apparently, liability has never been im-
posed for failure to report disease or injuries to the authorities in the absence of a statute
requiring physicians to ronort. See Landeros v. Flood, 50 Cal. Rptr. 713, 720 (1975).
37. Paulsen, Child Abuse Reporting Laws: The Shape of the Legisation, 67 COLUm. L.
REV. 1, 35 (1967).
38. Landeros v. Flood, 50 Cal. App. 3d 115, 123 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1975).
39. Id.
40. Id. at - , 123 Cal. Rptr. at 716.
41. ALA. CODE tit. 27- §§ 21-25 (Cum. Supp. 1973); ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.17.010-47.17.070
(1975); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. , 13-842.01 (Supp. 1973) ; ARK. STAT. ANN. .§§ 42-807-
42-818 (CuM. Supp. 1971); CAL. PENAL ConE 0 11.161.5 (-West Spp. 1976) : COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 19-10-101-19-10-108 (1973) : CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a (Supp.
1976) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 901-908 (1974) D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 2-161-2-166i (1973)
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 827 07, 827.041 (Silpp. 1975) ( A. CODE ANN. § 74-111 (Supp. 1975)
HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 350-1-350-5 1968) : TDAsO CODE § 16-1641 (Cum. Supp. 1975); ILL.
,!-,N. STAT. ch. 23, §§ 2041-2045 (Smith-Turd Surtp. 1975) : IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 12-3-4.1-1-
1.2-3-4.1-6 (Burns 1973) : IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 235A.1-235.11 (Cum. Supp. 1976); IAN.
,STAT. ANN. §§ 38-716-38-724 (Cum. Supp. 1975); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.335 (Bald-
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not provide for a civil remedy, 42 but, as t17e court noted in Landeros,4 3
that fact does not preclude a civil remedy under the statute.4 4 Even
if a civil remedy is not specifically provided for in the statute, it
can be said that the statute prescribes the standard of care re-
quired from a physician. 4 - In fact, violation of statute is in some
states negligence per se; 46 in other states, it is only evidence of ne-
gligence .4
Once a duty is set by statute, before there can be recovery in a
civil action based on that duty, it must be determined whether the
plaintiff is a member of the class of people the statute is meant to
protect.4 If the plaintiff is a member of that class, it must then be
determined whether the plaintiff suffered the particular harm the
statute is meant to prevent. 49 If both of these requirements are met,
win 1969): LA. REV. STAT. \NN. § 14 :403 (West Supp. 1975); Mn. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
22, §§ 3851-3S60 (Supp 1975): MYn. Coon A-N. art. 27, § 35A (Corn. Stpn. 1975): MAss.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119. § 51A (Supt. 1975) ; \IMcH. CoM\P. LAWS ANN. §9 722.571-722.574
(1968): MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556 (SUpP. 1976): MO. STAT. ANN. § 21().115 (Vernon
Supp. 1976) M ONT. REV. CODS ANN. §§ 10-1204-10-1308 (Cum. Spp. 1975); NEB. REV.
STAT. !§ 28-1501-28-1508 (Cim. Sup. 1974): NEv. REV. STAT. 00 200.501-200.508 (1972)
N.H. R-EV. STAT. ANN. §§ 169:37-169.45 (Supp. 1975) 'N.J. STAT. ANN. !§ 9:6-8.8--9:6-S.20
(Suop. 1975); N.M. ST.AT. ANN. 1 3-14-14.1-13-14-14.2 (Supp. 1975) : N.Y. SOC. SFRV.
LAW §§ 411-428 (MeKinney Supp. 1975): N.C. GFN. STAT. § 110-118 (Supp. 1975): N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 50-25.1-01-50-25.1-14 (Supp. 1975) : OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421
(Supp. 1975) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 845-849 (Supp. 1975) : ORE. REV. STAT. § 418.750
(1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2101-2110 (Siipn. 1975) : R.T. GPN. LAWS ANN. §§
40-11-1-40-11-10 (Supp. 1975) : S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-310.1-20-310.5 (1962) : S.D. Com-
PILED LAWS ANN. § 26-10-10 (Supp. 1975) : TENN. CoDE ANN. 0§ 37-1201-37-1212 (Cum.
Supp. 1975): TEx. FAN. CODE ANN. §§ 34.01-24.08 (Cirm. Sur. 1975) : UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 55-16-1-551-6-7 (Supn. 1975) : VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1.3, 0§ 1351-1355 (Curn. Su rp. 1975) ;
VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.3 (CUr. Supp. 1975) : WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.44.010-
26.44.080 (Supp. 1974) : W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-6A-2 (1976); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 48.9831
(Cum. Supp. 1975) ; Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-28.8-14-28.13 (Cum. SUpp. 1975).
42. Arkansas and New York are the only jurisdictions in which the child abuse reporting
statutes specifically provide for civil damages for noncompliance. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§
42-807 through 42-818 (Cum. Supp. 1975); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §§ 411-428 (McKinney
Supp. 1975).
43. Landeros v. Flood, 50 Cal. App. 3d 115, - , 123 Cal. Rptr. 713, 721 (1975).
44. See W. PROSSra, LAW OF TORTS § 36 (4th ed. 1971) ; Glatt v. Feist, 156 N.W.2d 819
(N.D. 1968) ; Richards v. Stanley, 42 Cal. 2d 60, 271 P.2d 23 (1954).
45. See generally WV. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS , 36 (4th ed. 1971).
46. E.g., Hardaway v. Consolidated Paper Co., 3C6 Mich. 190, 114 N.W.2d 236 (1962)
Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 126 N.E. 814 (1920); White v. Gore, 201 Va. 239, 110
S.E.2d 228 (1959). In the majority of jurisdictions, a violation of statute Is held to be
negligence per se. See AV. PROSSFR, LAW OF TORTS at 200 (4th ed. 1971). RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 288B (1965) states that violation of statute is negligence per se.
47. This minority position an'pears to be the rule in North Dakota. Anderson v. Miller's
Fairway Foods, 225 N.W.2d 579 (N.D. 1975) : Glatt v. Feist, 156 N.W.2d 819 (N.D. 1968).
See generally V. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS at 201 (4th ed. 1971).
48. See note 50 inf ra.
49. See V. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 36 (4th ed. 1971). In California, a presumption of
negligence is created by violation of statute. This presumption of negligence arises if the
requirement3 of CAL. EvID. CODE § 669 (Vest Supp. 1976) are satisfied. That statute pro-
vides in part that:
The failure of a person to exercise due care is presumed if: (1) He violated a
statute, ordinance, or regulation of a public entity; (2) The violation proxi-
mately caused death or injury to person or property; (3) The death or in-
jury resulted from an occurrence of the nature which the statute, ordinance
or regulation was designed to prevent; and (4) The person suffering the death
or the injury to his .erson or property was one of the class of persons for
whose protection the stntilte. ordiranoe, or regulation was adopted.
North Dakota has no similar statutory provision.
The RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965), provides that:
The court may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the re-
RECENT CASES
the plaintiff has a cause of action under the statute.50
It is generally agreed that the persons meant to be protected
by the child abuse reporting statutes are abused children, and that
the harm the statutes are meant to prevent is that which might re-
sult if those children are returned to their abusers.5 1 Thus, a child
who has received medical treatment for injuries resulting from his
parents' neglect or active physical abuse, and has been released to
his parents and suffers further injury, has a cause of action against
the physician who examined and treated him and failed to report
to the authorities.
Apparently, civil damages can be recovered. if it can be shown
that a battered child's injuries were caused by a physician's non-
compliance with the reporting statute.5 2 Generally, if it can be de-
termined that it was reasonably foreseeable that a child would suffer
further injuries if returned to his or her parents, and such injuries
do in fact occur, proximate causation is established.5 3 The interven-
ing criminal acts of the child abuser do not, as the Landeros court
noted, 54 become the superseding cause of the injury, if it is reason-
ably foreseeable that those acts would be committed. 5
In North Dakota, as in most other states, the physician can be
quirement of a legislative enactment Or an administrative regulation whose
purpose is found to be exclusively or in part (a) to protect a class of per-
sons which includes the one whose interest is invaded, and (b) to protect
the particular interest which is invaded, and (c) to protect that interest
against the kind of harm which has resulted, and, (d) to protect that interest
against the particular hazard from which the harm results.
50. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 36 (4th ed. 1971).
51. See Paulsen, note 14 supra. Many of the child abuse reporting statutes, including
North Dakota's, specifically provide that their purpose is to protect battered and other-
wise abused children from further injury. E.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.17.010-47.17.070 (1975) ;
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 901-908 (1974): KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-716-38-724 (Cum.
Supp. 1975) ; N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 50-25.1-01-50-25.1-14 (Supp. 1975).
52. Landeros v. Flood, 50 Cal. App. 3d 115, - , 123 Cal. Rptr. 713, 722 (1975).
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 449 (1965), provides that:
If the likelihood that a third person may act in a particular manner is the
hazard or one of the hazards which makes the actor negligent, such an act
whether innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious, or criminal does not pre-
vent the actor from being liable for harm caused thereby.
Although it appears that there are no North Dakota cases dealing with this subject, there
are cases In other jurisdictions that support the Resatement position. See, e.g., Raatikka v
Olin Mathleson Chemical Corp., 8 Mich. Arp. 638, 155 N.W.2d 205 (1967); Blessing v.
Welding, 226 Iowa 1178. 286 N.W. 436 (1939) ; Johnson v. Clement F. Scully Const. Co.,
255 Minn. 41, 95 N.W.2d 409 (1959).
54. Landeros v. Flood, 50 Cal. App. 3d 115, -, 123 Cal. Rptr. 713, 722 (1975).
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 449 (1965); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS at 283
(4th ed. 1971). Most commentators who have dealt with the subject agree that the recur-
rence of physical injuries inflicted by parents is the single most noteworthy characteristic
of child abuse. See, e.g., Kempe, Silverman, Steel, Droegermueller and Silver, The Battered
Child Syndrome, 181 J.A.M.A. 17 (1962); Fontana, Donovan and Wong, The "Maltreat-
ment Syndrome,' in Children, 269 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 1389 (1963).
We know that adults who attack children are likely to repeat the incident.
In view of the repetitive nature of the injuries, authorities on this subject
therefore believe it is dangerous to permit these children to remain or, to
return to their own home until the homes have been proved to be safe.
Rubin, The Need for Intervention, 24 PuB. WELFARE 230, 231 (1966).
If a parent has abused his or her child once, it is reasonably foreseeable that he or she
will do it again. Grummet, The Plaintive Plaintif/s: Victims of the Battered Child Syn-
drome, 4 FAM. L.Q. 296, 303-04 (1970).
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held liable if he had "reasonable cause to suspect" child abuse and
yet did not report it. 56 It would seem that the standard for judging
the reasonableness of the physician's suspicion, or lack thereof, is
the same standard of care applicable to the medical profession
generally: would a medical practicioner of the same skill and know-
ledge who is practicing in the same locality have suspected child
abuse in the particular situation in question.5 7 If a reasonably pru-
dent physician would have suspected child abuse, there is a statutory
duty to report.
As noted above, reporting statutes usually require persons other
than physicians to report.58 Generally, anyone who in his professional
capacity would be likely to come into contact with abused children
is required to report.5 9 Thus, teachers, social workers, day care
workers, policemen, and others are often required by statute to re-
port suspected cases of child abuse.6 0 Requiring people to report
who do not possess a physician's skill and knowledge, however, may
present come constitutional problems.6 1
Civil liability for noncompliance with reporting statutes will
help governmental agencies in detecting and preventing child abuse.
62
The possibility of such liability for noncompliance should make phy-
sicians more aware of the child abuse problem, and hopefully will
increase the number of reports made to the proper state authorities.
This will further the purpose of the child abuse laws, and should not
constitute an onerous burden on physicians, since they have a le-
gal duty imposed upon them by statute to report suspected cases of
child abuse.
JEFFREY HANNIG
56. N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-03 (Supp. 1975). See also, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§
42-807--42-818 (Cur. Supp. 1975); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a (Supp. 1976); Ky.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.335 (Baldwin, 1969).
57. See Landeros v. Flood, 50 Cal. App. 3d 115, - , 123 Cal. Rptr. 713, 717, 718 (1975).
See also note 34 supra.
58. See Paulsen, note 14 supra, at 712.
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-03 (Supp. 1975).
61. Landeros v. Flood, 50 Cal. App. 3d 115, - , 123 Cal. Rptr. 713, 725 (1975) [dic.
tum]. To bring an action under the statute against those who do not possess a physician's
skill and knowledge may be unconscionable and would perhaps subject the statute to con-
stitutional challenge for unreasonableness, uncertainty and vagueness. See Papachristou
v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972), where a vagrancy statute was held to be unconstitu-
tionally vague, and thus void.
62. Kohlman, Malpractice Liability for Failing to Report Child Abuse, 49 CAL. S.B.J.
118 (1974). Mr. Kohlman was plaintiff's counsel in Landeros v. Flood, 50 Cal. App. 3d
115, 123 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1975).
